This Article considers the position of defendants charged with murder who are found to be unfit to plead or insane at the time of the offence. If the court is satisfied that the defendant did the act charged as murder then the judge has no option but to impose a hospital order with restrictions. This Article examines the statutory requirements for medical evidence prior to a finding of unfitness or insanity and asks whether this satisfies the requirements of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It concludes that there is no obvious justification for requiring defendants to be sent to hospital in the absence of a conviction where the medical evidence does not indicate that such a disposal is necessary. It follows that the current practice is likely to violate the Convention.
Introduction

Disposal of cases in unfitness and insanity cases
The passing of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 (the 1991 Act) introduced a significantly more enlightened framework for dealing with defendants who were unfit to plead or insane. First, it implemented a trial of the facts procedure to ensure that unfit accused could be acquitted outright if it could not be proved that they had done the act charged as the offence. Secondly, it gave the judge a much broader discretion in respect of disposal options. 1 Whereas previously an unfit or insane accused faced a mandatory admission to hospital order with restrictions, 2 the 1991 Act permits the judge to impose a range of additional disposals, namely an admission order without restrictions, a guardianship order, a supervision and treatment order or, if appropriate, an order for absolute discharge.
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Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (The 1964 Act) prior to 1991 permitted only one disposal -an admission order with restrictions without limit of time. 3 1991 Act section 3 -this introduced the range of disposals into the 1964 Act section 5(2)(b).
Statutory requirements for medical evidence in unfitness and insanity cases
A jury is not permitted to find that a person is unfit to plead except on the oral or written evidence of two doctors at least one of whom is approved under section 12 of the Mental Health Act 1983. 4 The same requirement applies to a finding of insanity. 5 The role of the psychiatrist in cases where offenders may be unfit or insane involves an assessment of whether the tests for unfitness 6 or insanity 7 are met in view of the state of the accused. In cases other than murder, the psychiatrist may often be asked for an opinion regarding disposal, which is dependent to a significant degree on the type of mental disorder the accused is found to suffer from.
Residual mandatory disposal for murder cases
Section 5(3) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 (the 1964 provides that the range of disposals outlined above "shall not apply where the offence to which the special verdict or findings relate is an offence the sentence for which is fixed by law". In such cases the only disposal available is an admission order with a restriction order without limit of time. 8 The only offence for which the sentence is fixed by law is murder. This provision thus represents a mandatory disposal for those found unfit to plead to the indictment or those acquitted by way of the special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity because they were insane at the time of the commission of the offence.
Triggering Article 5 of the European Convention
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to liberty and security of the person. The right is not absolute but is subject to interference where the deprivation is "lawful", "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" and for a permitted reason. These reasons include detention as a consequence of conviction for a criminal offence under Article 5(1)(a) and detention of those who are of "unsound mind" under Article 5(1)(e). It is important to note that defendants who are found unfit to plead or insane are not convicted of a criminal offence.
9 It follows that Article 5(1)(a) cannot justify their detention. If detention is to be justified, then, it must comply with the requirements of Article 5(1)(e). The leading case of Winterwerp v Netherlands 10 considered a challenge to detention under Dutch mental health legislation. The European Court of Human Rights made the following important ruling regarding detention for mental disorder:
"The next issue to be examined is the 'lawfulness' of the detention for the purposes of Article 5 (1) (e). Such 'lawfulness' presupposes conformity with the domestic law in the first place and also … conformity with the purpose of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 (1) (e ); it is required in respect of both the ordering and the execution of the measures involving 10 Cl & F 200, [1843-60] All ER Rep 229. See Blackstones 2002 A3.12-3.18. 8 1991 deprivation of liberty. … in a democratic society subscribing to the rule of law, no detention that is arbitrary can ever be regarded as ' lawful'. … In the Court's opinion, except in emergency cases, the individual concerned should not be deprived of his liberty unless he has been reliably shown to be of 'unsound mind'. The very nature of what has to be established before the competent national authority -that is, a true mental disorder -calls for objective medical expertise. Further, the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement. What is more, the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder."
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For present purposes the essential requirements for detention under Article 5(1)(e) are thus:
(i) the defendant is reliably shown on the basis of objective medical expertise to have a true mental disorder;
(ii) the disorder is of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; and (iii) the disorder must persist throughout the detention. This in turn requires periodic access to an authority with the characteristics of a court in order to review the lawfulness of the continued detention under Article 5(4).
In Verbanov v Bulgaria 12 the European court confirmed the Winterwerp criteria and also emphasized the need to avoid arbitrary decision-making:
"The Court further reiterates that a necessary element of the "lawfulness" of the detention within the meaning of Article 5(1)(e) is the absence of arbitrariness. The detention of an individual is such a serious measure that it is only justified where other, less severe measures, have been considered and found to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest which might require that the person concerned be detained. The deprivation of liberty must be shown to have been necessary in the circumstances." 14 The Court of Appeal considered the Mental Health Act 1983 requirements for discharge of restricted patients. 15 Lord Woolf said of the Article 5(1)(e) requirements as follows:
"… the test is whether it can 'reliably be shown' that he or she suffers from a mental disorder sufficiently serious to warrant detention." 16 The Court found that the statutory provisions effectively reversed the burden of proof required by the Convention. The provisions could not be interpreted compatibly with the Convention right so the Court granted a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Is Article 5 breached by compulsory admission to hospital?
Central to the justification for detention under Article 5(1)(e) is the medical evidence. It must reliably show that the person has a true mental disorder which requires confinement. The potential problem with the tests for unfitness and insanity is that they do not mirror the requirements of the Convention for lawful detention. 18 Moreover, the legislation does not require the judge to consider whether the person suffers from a "true mental disorder" before imposing an admission order.
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It follows that a person could be admitted to hospital without any evidence that they are currently suffering from a mental disorder, or even with contrary evidence. Such a situation would be in clear conflict with the Article 5 principles outlined above. As will be seen, the Human Rights Act 1998 provides a remedy for this defect in respect of most cases but not where the charge is murder.
The medical evidence in unfitness cases goes to the question of ability to participate in the proceedings. This has been interpreted as meaning that the accused can, "understand and reply rationally to the indictment … exercise his right to challenge jurors, understand the details of the evidence … instruct his legal advisers and give evidence himself…" 20 . It follows that an accused can be unfit to plead without having a recognised mental disorder, let alone one requiring detention. Indeed, courts have upheld findings that accused are unfit in cases where no mental health problem at all was identified but rather a physical communication problem.
21 Such cases are rare 22 but the overriding point is that the medical evidence is used to ascertain a different issue (fitness) from that required by the Convention (mental disorder).
The medical evidence in an insanity case goes to the question of whether an accused was insane under the test in McNaughten's Case: "… it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong." 23 The courts have made clear on a number of occasions that this test does not necessarily conform to medical conceptions of mental disorder. In R v Sullivan 24 Lord Diplock rejected medical evidence that an epileptic seizure should not be a disease of the mind where it is only transitory: "The nomenclature adopted by the medical profession may change from time to time … But the meaning of the expression 'disease of the mind' as the cause of a 'defect of reason' remains unchanged for the purposes of the application of the M'Naughten rules … it matters not whether the aetiology of the impairment is organic, as in epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment itself is permanent or is transient and intermittent, provided that it subsisted at the time of commission of the act."
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This built on earlier dictum to similar effect in R v Kemp 26 where the medical evidence differed as to whether lack of mens rea due to arteriosclerosis was caused by a disease of the mind. Devlin J ruled that it did not matter which medical evidence was accepted:
"In my judgment the words … are not to be construed as if they were put in for the purpose of distinguishing between diseases which have a mental origin and diseases which have a physical origin … Hardening of the arteries is a disease which is shown on the evidence to be capable of affecting the mind in such a way as to cause a defect, temporarily or permanently, of its reasoning, understanding and so on … and so is a disease of the mind … within the meaning of the Rules." There is an additional difficulty in respect of insanity. It should be recalled that the special verdict is returned only if the accused was insane at the time of the offence. It follows that the medical evidence must look back in time rather than considering the position of the accused when he or she appears before the court. There could be a long delay between the offence being committed and the trial taking place. Even if the accused was suffering from a mental disorder requiring detention at the time of the offence this does not mean that the same must hold true at the time of the trial. Treatment received in the interim or changed circumstances may mean that the disorder has abated. The European Court has ruled that the Convention requires that: "… no deprivation of liberty of a person considered as being of unsound mind may be deemed in conformity with Article 5(1)(e) of the Convention if it has been ordered without seeking the opinion of a medical expert. Any other approach falls short of the required protection against arbitrariness, inherent in Article 5 of the Convention. … Furthermore, the medical assessment must be based on the actual state of mental health of the person concerned and not solely on past events. A medical opinion cannot be seen as sufficient to justify deprivation of liberty if a significant period of time has elapsed.
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The upshot for both unfitness and insanity cases is that hospital detention under the 1964 Act may often not meet the criteria in Article 5 and will therefore violate the Convention.
The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 on compulsory hospital disposal
It is submitted that the Human Rights Act can and should be used to avoid breaches of Article 5 in the disposal process. Judges ought to have in mind that they are a public authority under the Act 31 and must therefore act compatibly with the Convention rights unless prevented from doing so by primary legislation. 32 The Act permits defendants to rely on the Convention rights in any legal proceedings 33 , which clearly includes the criminal trial and the disposal process. Moreover, section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires the courts to interpret all legislation, including the 1964 Act, compatibly with the Convention rights unless it is impossible to do so. 34 It follows that despite the legislation apparently permitting the judge to detain a person in breach of Article 5, it does not require such an approach. The 1991 Act introduced the range of "nondetention" disposals outlined earlier. The courts must therefore draw a distinction between a finding of unfitness or insanity and the appropriate disposal of a defendant who has been found to be unfit or insane. In this way the legal tests for unfitness and insanity can remain as they are 35 but detention will not be ordered unless there is clear medical evidence that the accused currently suffers from a true mental disorder. If this evidence has not emerged from the psychiatric reports leading to the finding of unfitness or insanity then separate medical evidence will be required. In those cases where the evidence does not show there is a mental disorder the accused must be dealt with by way of a community-based disposal.
The insuperable problem of mandatory disposal
As has been seen, where the accused was charged with murder then the trial judge has no choice but to impose an admission order with a restriction order. This mandatory disposal seems on the face of it to violate Article 5 as in those cases where the evidence does not show the accused has a mental disorder the accused will nonetheless be sent to hospital. The Human Rights Act cannot lead to a different conclusion as it preserves the validity and enforceability of legislation that cannot be interpreted compatibly with the Convention -sometimes referred to as "irredeemable incompatibility". 36 Moreover, a judge does not act unlawfully under the Human Rights Act if s/he is compelled to so act by legislation that is incompatible with the Convention.
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The Court of Appeal recognised the apparent impasse in R v Heather Grant 38 . The main issue in the case was whether the defence of provocation could be relied upon in the trial of the facts, the Court of Appeal ruling that it could not. 39 The Court also rejected an Article 6 submission that the decision of the prosecution to charge murder amounted to pre-determination by a body that was not independent and impartial. 40 However, their Lordships identified one important point of concern:
33 Ibid. section 7 (1) suffers from a mental disorder sufficiently serious to warrant detention'. The procedures under the 1964 Act are not directed specifically to that question. The issue under section 4 is whether the defendant has sufficient intellect to instruct his legal team, to plead to the indictment, to challenge jurors, to understand the evidence and to give evidence. Those criteria do not correspond directly to the criteria for a mental disorder sufficiently serious to warrant detention and it may be possible for a person to be found unfit to be tried without his suffering from a mental disorder sufficiently serious to warrant detention. Yet once a person facing a charge of murder has been found to be unfit to be tried, there is no further consideration of his mental condition under the statutory procedures prior to admission to hospital. … This feature of the procedure does raise the question of whether detention is 'arbitrary' in the sense explained by the European Court of Human Rights in Winterwerp and Johnson.
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Although these comments relate to the unfitness procedure they are equally applicable to insanity cases. If the detention is arbitrary then the only domestic remedy is a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act. A trial judge does not have jurisdiction to make such an order so defendants will have to appeal in order to seek an order. 42 The government would then have to consider whether to introduce a remedial order. It should be noted that despite the potential for a breach of Article 5, the medical evidence might be sufficient for the judge to find a mental disorder requiring detention. In such cases then, although the judge has no discretion over the disposal, the detention will not in fact violate Article 5. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Heather Grant found that "the conditions for detention, albeit not considered in terms under the statutory procedure, were in fact met." All of the medical evidence stated that the appellant suffered from mental impairment, albeit one expert said that guardianship could have been considered had the statute not precluded it.
Deference to Parliament?
The Court of Appeal did not therefore have to resolve the issue of compatibility in the instant case. Their Lordships thought that the apparent breach might be avoided by taking a wide view of the discretion of Parliament within Article 5: "The answer to it may lie, but does not necessarily do so, in Mr Eadie's submission that this is a difficult and complex area where Parliament has carried out the requisite balancing exercise and has concluded that, where it has been found by a jury that a person is unfit to be tried and has done the act charged as murder, the automatic consequence ought to be admission to hospital as prescribed in s.5 (subject to the person's right to make an immediate application to the MHRT and to the other protections afforded to a person subject to detention under these provisions); that the court should afford a measure of deference to Parliament in such a field; and that in all the circumstances the procedure is not to be stigmatised as arbitrary for the purposes of Article 5."
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This appears to be a type of "discretionary area of judgment" approach. The courts have developed this doctrine as a domestic version of the Convention concept of margin of appreciation. It recognises the respective roles of Parliament and the courts and affords a degree of deference to the executive and legislative branches of government on the basis of their democratic mandate, particularly in areas of social, economic or political policy.
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The Court of Appeal obviously did not consider the matter in detail and it is submitted that had it done so, it would have rejected the notion that the court should defer to Parliament in this field. First, the issue concerned relates not so much to matters of social, economic or political judgment but to a matter of high constitutional importance -the right to liberty of the person. Secondly, even if it is accepted that this is an area of social policy, it is not clear what the justification for the policy is. Unless deference is equated with unquestioning acceptance, the court must be able to address the reason for a particular policy. 45 Bland assertions that this is a difficult and complex area are insufficient, particularly at a time when even the mandatory sentence for murder is subject to heightened scrutiny. 46 Thirdly, drawing upon Canadian jurisprudence, it can be seen that the margin of discretion ought to be drawn more narrowly where, as in criminal proceedings, the state is pitted against the individual: "[T]he courts will judge the legislature's choice more harshly in areas where the government plays the role of the 'singular antagonist of the individual' …" 47 Fourthly, the discretionary area of judgment should be narrower in areas where the courts are particularly well suited to deciding the issues. It is suggested that this holds true in respect of requirements for evidence of mental disorder and the need for detention. 48 The idea that Parliament is better placed to balance the respective interests of the public and the individual in cases where people are detained on the basis of unsound mind is unsustainable. Fifthly, 
